This article describes some special problems facing expert witnesses presenting statistical evidence when they testify in court. Since the legal system, especially in civil cases, serves as a dispute resolution process that needs to reach a decision in a timely manner, its objectives and procedures differ from those in pure science. Unlike the classroom or summarizing their research in a talk where the statistician determines the presentation, in the courtroom a witness is only allowed to answer questions posed by the others, mainly the lawyers for both parties. One case where the author could not persuade the lawyer to ask a set of questions designed to show that the other 'expert' was using a statistical that had no power and consequently would never indicate that the data were consistent with discrimination is described. In contrast, a case where the judge understood the need for the data analysis to correspond to the time frame of the case and accepted the Mantel-Haenszel test as an appropriate way to analyse stratified data arising in a discrimination case is summarized. Several suggestions designed to improve the effectiveness of statistical testimony and related issues arising in Daubert hearings that screen proposed expert analyses for scientific reliability are given. Recently, a distinguished scientist wrote an editorial in Science that supported epidemiologists who had obtained data solely for use in a case but later submitted an article to a journal, apparently in violation of the court's order. The last section questions this view as it diminishes the value of commitments researchers give the public when they obtain information about individuals and recommends that statisticians obtain permission to write an article based on their research at the time they are engaged.
or approach an investigator may take to a problem. 3 In most uses of statistics in legal proceedings, by contrast, the relevant events happened several years ago and rarely will you be able to collect additional data. 4 Often, the available data will have been created for administrative purposes, e.g. payroll files, attendance records or job application forms, which you will need to rely on.
Civil cases differ from criminal cases in that the penalty for violating a non-criminal legal rule is not time in prison but rather compensation for the harm done. The burden of proof a plaintiff has in a discrimination or tort case is to show that the defendant caused the alleged harm by 'the preponderance of the evidence' and plaintiff is not required to meet the stricter standard of 'beyond a reasonable doubt' that applies in criminal cases. The rules of evidence, however, are generally the same in civil and criminal trials and the federal courts use the same criteria to determine whether or not proposed testimony or other evidence may be presented to the trier of fact (the jury, or in a bench trial, the trial judge).
A major difference between presenting testimony in court or a regulatory hearing and giving a talk at a major scientific conference is that expert witnesses, just like other witnesses, are only allowed to answer questions put to them by the lawyers. Thus, particular findings or analyses that you believe are very important may not be submitted as evidence if the lawyer who has put you on the stand does not ask you about them during your testimony. Unless the judge, or in some jurisdictions a juror, asks you a question related to that topic, you are not allowed to discuss it. In addition to carrying out your analysis and presenting it in court, you may be asked to criticize or question the soundness of the analyses and statements of the other party's expert. Sometimes you may be frustrated because the court does not understand or appreciate your criticism. At other times, you may point out a valid criticism or question to the lawyer who hired you but that lawyer may fail to follow up by raising the topic during the cross-examination of the other side's expert. Then, when you are giving rebuttal testimony, you may not be able to discuss the topic because the lawyer failed to get the other expert to give an opinion about it. The reason for this is that your rebuttal is limited to answering the testimony of the other expert.
Courts have also adopted criteria to assess the reliability of scientific evidence as well as rules requiring some traditional ways of presenting and analysing some types of data. 5 These legal strictures may limit the range of analyses you can use in the case at hand-although they may subsequently serve to stimulate interesting statistical research. From a scientific view, a potentially more serious threat to one's research in a case is that typically the lawyers provide you with the data as well as inform you about the legal context and related background. Thus, you may not be told about, much less provided, other data sets and the information you are given about the role some of the variables played in the decisions being analysed may be incomplete. While it has been recommended that statisticians and other scientists conducting studies for lawyers that are likely to lead to their testifying 'under oath' inquire about the existence of other data, I believe that the lawyers are not obligated to give it to you or even inform you about the availability of other data. 6 Of course, if these data are unfavourable to the party represented by the lawyer who hired you during cross-examination, the lawyer for the opposing party may ask why you did not analyse that data set.
A related complication can arise when the lawyer hires both a consulting expert and a testifying expert. The data available to the consulting expert is protected by the 'work product' rule. The testifying expert may only be asked to analyse the data favourable to the defendant and may not be told that any other information exists. Sometimes, an analytic approach, e.g. regression analysis, will be suggested to this expert because the lawyer already knows the outcome. If one believes an alternative statistical technique would be preferable or at least deserves exploration, the expert may be constrained as to the choice of methodology in addition to being limited to partial data. 7 In this paper, I will describe some examples of these problems. Section 1 will illustrate how some 'traditions' that courts have adopted also may have an impact on the presentation of the evidence. The data discussed also lead to a description of the difficulty of getting lawyers and judges to appreciate the statistical concept of 'power', the ability of a test to detect a real or important difference. As a consequence, an analysis that used a test with no power was accepted by a court. Section 2 will show how in a subsequent case I was able to present more detailed data, which helped make the data clearer to the court. The last section offers some suggestions for improving the quality of statistical analyses and their presentation.
Presenting the data or summary tables for statistical analysis
In the classic case of Castenada v. Partida, 8 which considered whether Mexican-Americans were discriminated against in the jury selection process, the court summarized the data by years, i.e. the data for all juries during the year were aggregated and the minority fraction was compared to their fraction of the total population as well as the sub-group eligible for jury service. 9 Then, the usual test for checking whether data from a binomial distribution is consistent with a pre-specified value of the success probability ( p) was applied to the total numbers of minority and majority jurors for 11 years of relevant data. It showed a highly significant difference between the Mexican-American fraction of jurors (39%) and both their fraction of the total population (79.1%) and of adults with Males: 5; 7; 12; 14; 14; 14; 18; 21; 22, 23; 24; 25; 25; 34; 34; 37; 47; 49; 64; 67; 69; 125; 192; 483. some schooling (65%). From a statistical view, the case is important since it established that formal statistical hypothesis testing would be used rather than intuitive judgements about whether the difference between the percentage of jurors who were from the minority group differed sufficiently from the minority percentage of people eligible for jury service. When the lower courts followed the methodology laid out in Castenada, they also adopted the tradition of presenting yearly summaries of the data in discrimination cases.
In jury discrimination cases, the aggrieved party making the complaint is typically the defendant in a criminal case, and not the minority juror who was dismissed, but in equal employment cases the complaining party is typically the plaintiff, the individual who suffered the alleged discriminatory act. In the United States, the plaintiff in such a civil action has a short time period of either 180 or 300 days, depending on whether there is a discrimination agency in the particular state, from the time of the alleged act, e.g. from the time of not being hired or promoted or the time of being laid off, to file a formal complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). Quite often, after receiving notice of the complaint, the employer will modify its system to mitigate the effect of the employment practice under scrutiny on the minority group in question. The impact of this 'change' in policy on statistical analysis has often been overlooked by courts. In particular, if a change occurs during the same year the charge is made, the employer may change its policy and include the post-charge minority hires or promotions in its analysis.
Let me use data from a case, Capaci v. Katz & Besthoff, 10 in which I was an expert for the plaintiffs to illustrate this. On 11 January 1973, the plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination against women in promotions in the pharmacy department. One way such discriminatory practices may be carried out is to require female employees to work longer at the firm before promotion than males. Therefore, a study comparing the length of time males and female pharmacists served before they were promoted to chief pharmacist was carried out. The time frame considered started in 1 July 1965, the effective date of the Civil Rights Act, until the date of the charge. The amount of time, in months, pharmacists worked at the company before receiving a promotion are reported in Table 1 .
Applying the Wilcoxon test, incorporating ties, yielded a statistically significant difference ( p-value = 0.02). The average number of months the two females worked until they were promoted was 341, while the average male worked for 59 months before their promotion. The corresponding medians were 341 and 25 months, respectively. The defendant's expert presented the data, given in Table 2 , broken out into two time periods ending at the end of a year. The first was from 1965 until the end of 1973 and the second was from 1974 until 1978. Before discussing the statistical analysis notice in the defendant's data for the period 1965-1973, there are three more females and eight more males in the defendant's data than in Table 1 because their expert included nearly 1 year of data subsequent to the charge. Furthermore, the three females fall in the service categories of 20-29, 30-39 and 70-79 months, which are much smaller than the length of service prior to promotions of the two females promoted before the charge. 1965 -1973 and 1974 -1978 Combined 1965 -1973 1974 -1978 1965 -1978 The defendant's expert analysed all three data sets in Table 2 with the median test and found no significant differences. He also analysed the data submitted by the plaintiffs using the median test and did not find a statistically significant difference between the time served until promotion between male and female pharmacists. Thus, the court had to decide whether the median or Wilcoxon test was the preferable method.
Although I testified that the median had low power of detecting a difference between the two samples, I also tried to have plaintiffs' lawyer ask the following series of questions to the defendant's expert on cross-examination:
1. What is the difference between the average time to promotion of the male and female pharmacists in Table 1 4. Suppose the difference in the two means or averages was 1000 years, would the median test have found a statistically significant difference between the times that females had to work before being promoted than males? Expected answer: No.
5. Suppose the difference in the two means or averages was 1 million years, would the median test have found a statistically significant difference between the times that females had to work before being promoted than males? Expected answer: No.
My thought was that the above sequence of questions would have shown the judge the practical implication of finding a non-significant result with a test that did not have any power in the statistical sense. Unfortunately, after the lawyer asked the first question, she jumped to the last one. By doing so, the consequence of using a statistical test that could not detect a difference was not made clear to the judge. When I asked why, the lawyer told me she felt that the other expert realized the point. Of course, the questions were designed to explain the practical meaning of statistical 'power' to the trial judge, and not to the expert. A while later, a more experienced lawyer told me that after receiving the No answers to the five questions he would have turned to the expert and asked him:
6. As your statistical test could not detect a difference of a million years between the times to promotion of male and female employees, just how long would my client need to work without receiving a promotion before your test would find a statistically significant difference?
This experience motivated me to look further into the power properties of non-parametric tests, especially in the unbalanced sample size setting. 11 In preparing this paper, I realized that it might have been useful to examine Table 2 summarizing the defendant's time to promotion data in the preand post-charge periods by the Wilcoxon test. It turns out that the Wilcoxon test would still detect a significant difference to the disadvantage of females in the time to promotion of male and female pharmacists in the 1965-1973 period ( p-value = 0.02). Because both the trial and appellate judges accepted the median test as being valid, I doubt that this additional analysis would have affected the outcome.
Although I do not recall whether the data on months served until promotion for each individual contributing to the defendant's exhibit were available, I do know that using the SAS program for the Wilcoxon test on the data in the defendant's exhibit for the years 1974-1978 yields a two-sided p-value of 0.06, suggesting that on average female employees were promoted after serving less time than males. The mean (median) time to promotion for males was 65.725 (35) months while for females it was 11.66 (15) months. Thus, after the charge, a typical male had to work at least 1 year more than a female before being promoted to chief pharmacist. This is an example of a phenomenon I refer to as 'A funny thing happens on the way to the courtroom'. From both a 'common sense' standpoint as well as a legal one, the employment actions in the period leading up to the complaint have the most relevance for determining what happened when the plaintiff was being considered for promotion. 12 Indeed, quite often, a plaintiff applies for promotion on several occasions and only after being denied it on all of them, files a formal charge. 13 Comment 1. Baldus and Cole 14 refer to the dispute concerning the Wilcoxon and median tests in the Capaci case in a section concerning the difference between practical and statistical significance. Let me quote them:
Exclusive concern for the statistical significance of a disparity encourages highly technical skirmishes between plaintiff's and defendants' experts who may find competing methods of computing statistical significance advantageous in arguing their respective positions (citing the Capaci case). The importance of such skirmishes may be minimized by limiting the role of a test of significance to that of aiding in the interpretation of a measure of impact whose practical significance may be evaluated on non-technical grounds.
Thus, even the authors of perhaps the most often cited text on statistical proof of discrimination at the time did not appreciate the importance of the theory of hypothesis testing and the role of statistical power in choosing between tests. More importantly, a difference in the median time to promotion of 341 − 25 = 316 or about 15 years (or the difference in the average times of 23.5 years) would appear to me to be of practical significance. These well-respected authors as well as the judiciary allowed the defendant's expert to use the median test, which had no power to detect a difference in time to promotion, to obfuscate a practically meaningful difference. Comment 2. The expert for the defendant was a social scientist rather than a statistician. Other statisticians who have faced experts of this type have mentioned to me that often non-statisticians have not had sufficient training in our subject to know that there may be several alternative methods and that there are statistical criteria that enable us to select an appropriate procedure from them for a particular problem. Non-statisticians may select the first procedure that comes to mind or choose a method that helps their client even though it is quite inappropriate. Their lack of a sound background in statistical theory and its application makes it difficult for the lawyer you are working for to get them to admit that their method is not as powerful (or accurate or reliable) as yours or that their chosen method is sensitive to modest violations of the assumptions needed for its validity. An example of this occurred in a case concerning sex discrimination in pay when an 'expert' compared the wages of small groups of roughly similar males and females with the t-test. It is well known that typically income and wage data are quite skewed and that the distribution of the two-sample t-test in small samples depends on the assumption of normality. I provided this information to the lawyer who then asked the other 'expert' whether he had ever done any research using income or wage data (Ans. No) and whether he had ever carried out any research or read literature on the t-test and its properties (Ans. No). Thus, it was difficult for the lawyer to get this 'expert' to admit that using the t-test in such a situation is questionable and the significance levels might not be reliable. On a more positive note, the Daubert 15 opinion listed several criteria for courts to evaluate expert scientific testimony, one of which is that the method used has a known error rate. Today, one might be able to fit a skewed distribution to the data and then show by simulation that a nominal 0.05 level test has an actual level (α) of 0.10 or more. Similarly, if one must use the t-test, in such a situation, one could conduct a simulation study to obtain 'correct' critical values that will ensure that a nominal 0.05 level test has true level between 0.04 and 0.06. 16 Another way of demonstrating that an expert does not possess relevant knowledge is for the lawyer to show the expert a book or article that states the point you wish to make and ask the expert to read it and then say whether he or she agrees or disagrees with the point. 17 If that expert disagrees, a follow-up question can inquire why or on what grounds does he or she disagree with it.
The tradition of reporting data by year also makes it more difficult to demonstrate that a change occurred after a charge was filed. This phenomenon also occurred in the hiring data from the Capaci case, 18 but this paper discusses the promotion data from Valentino v. U.S.P.S. 19 as it has been examined from both the frequentist 20 and Bayesian 21 perspectives. The plaintiff had applied for a promotion in 1976 and filed the charge in May 1976. The data for each year, given in Table 3 , were analysed by the Mantel-Haenszel (MH) test applied to the 2 × 2 tables for each year and the results are reported in Table 4 . The grade grouping followed the system used by the Civil Service Commission in its reports. Notice that during the first two time periods, the number of grade advancements 15 509 U. S. 579 (1993) . 16 Although I use the 0.05 level for illustration, I agree with Judge Posner who wrote in Kadas v. MCI Systemhouse Corp. 85 FEP Cases 1720 , 1723 (7th Cir. 2001 ) that it should not be used as a talisman. He indicates that the 0.05 criterion was chosen as a convenience for editors of journals and should not be used as the criterion for determining the admissibility of statistical studies. Indeed, Judge P. Higginbotham's discussion in Vuyanich v. Republic National Bank, 505 F. Supp. 224 (N.D., Texas 1980) that the p-value should not be considered an either or proposition but a 'sliding scale' is more sensible. He wrote, 'as the probability of an event's occurrence in a nondiscriminatory environment decreases, the significance of the results increases in a continuous fashion'. The two-sided p-value 0.06 on the post-charge time until promotion data from the Capaci case illustrates the wisdom of the statements of these judges. First, the unbalanced sample sizes diminish the power of two-sample tests. More importantly, the change in the promotion practices of the defendant subsequent to the charge are quite clear from the change in difference in average waiting times until promotion of males and females and the change from a significant difference in favour of males before the charge to a nearly significant change in favour of females after the charge. awarded to females for each year is significantly less than expected. After 1976, when the charge was filed, the female employees start to receive their expected number of promotions. My best recollection is that the promotion the plaintiff applied for was the 34th competitive one filed in 1976. Unfortunately, data on all of the applicants were not available even though EEOC guidelines do require employers to preserve records for at least 6 months. Of the 17 or so promotions, from these 34, for which information about the actual applicants was available, all were given to a male candidate. Since females did receive their expected number of promotions over the entire year, it would appear that the defendant changed its practices after the charge. The implications of this possibility, however, were not examined in the case. 22 22 The data discussed in the cited references considered employees in job categories classified by their level in the system. The district court accepted the defendant's criticism that since each job level contains positions in a variety of occupations, the plaintiffs should have stratified the data by occupation; see 511 F. Supp. 917, 939 (D. DC, 1981) . Later in the opinion, at 511 F. Supp. 951, the opinion accepted a regression analysis submitted by the defendant that used grade level as a predictor of salary noting that 'level' is a good proxy for occupation. While upholding the ultimate finding that U.S.P.S. did not discriminate against women, the appellate opinion, 674 F.2d at 71, did not accept the district court's criticism that a regression submitted There was one unusual non-statistical aspect of the case; the Postal Service had changed the system of reviewing candidates for promotions as of 1 January 1976. Since no other charges of discrimination in promotion had been filed in either 1974 or 1975, the analysis of data for those years is considered background information unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the same process carried over into the time period when the promotion in question was made. 23 Both the trial and appellate court opinions mentioned that the plaintiff in Valentino had not established the required connection between the defendant's earlier practices and procedures and those used in May 1976. Thus, even if the courts had been presented with statistical evidence of a change in practices subsequent to the filing of the complaint, the legal decision might be the same.
In sum, when data are reported in yearly periods, invariably some post-charge data will be included in the data for the year in which the charge was filed. Statisticians should examine it to see if there is evidence of a change in employment practice subsequent to the charge. In the Capaci case, the defendants included 11 months of post-charge promotions in their first time period, 1965-1973. The inclusion of three additional females promoted in that period lessens the impact of the fact that only two female pharmacists were promoted during the previous 7.5 years on a judge or jury. Similarly, reporting the data by year in Valentino does not enable a statistician to investigate whether the new promotion system begun at the start of 1976 was changed or monitored more closely after the charge.
A more informative summary of promotion data: Hogan v. Pierce 24
The plaintiff in the case alleged that he had been denied a promotion to a GS-14 level position in the computer division of a government agency and filed a formal complaint in 1977. As the files on the actual applicants were unavailable, we considered all individuals employed in GS-13 level jobs whose records indicated that they met the Civil Service criteria for a promotion to the next job level to be the pool of 'qualified applicants'. 25 There were about 10 opportunities for promotion to a GS-14 post during the several years prior to the complaint. About three of the successful GS-14 job applicants were outside candidates who had a Ph.D. in computer science; all of whom were white. Since they had a higher level of education than the internal candidates, they are excluded from Table 5 , which gives the number of employees who were eligible and the number promoted, by race, for the 10 job announcements.
by plaintiffs should have included the level of a position. The reason is that in a promotion case, it is advancement in one's job level that is the issue. Thus, courts do accept regressions that include major other job-related characteristics, such as experience, education, special training and objective measures of productivity. The appropriateness of the explanatory variables used in regression models is an important one. A good discussion with references to the literature is found in RUBINFELD, D. L. (2000) Reference guide on multiple regression. Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence. Federal Judicial Center (www.fjc.gov), p. 187. 23 In Evans v. United Airlines, the Supreme Court stated that since charges of employment discrimination need to be filed within 180 days of the charge, earlier data are useful background information but are not sufficient by itself to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. If there is a continuing violation, however, the earlier data can be used in conjunction with more recent data by the plaintiffs. The complex legal issues involved in determining when past practices have continued into the time period relevant to a particular case are beyond the scope of the present paper.
24 31 F.E.P. 115 (D.D.C. 1983) . 25 These qualifications were that they were employed in an appropriate computer-related position and had at lest 1 year of experience at the previous level (GS-13) or its equivalent. Although the data are longitudinal in nature and technically one might want to apply a survival test such as the log-rank procedure, at the time it was easier to analyse the data by the MH test that combines the observed minus expected numbers from the individual 2 × 2 tables. 26 Although there were only 18 promotions awarded to internal candidates during the period under consideration, none of them went to a black. Moreover, because no black had been promoted, it was possible to calculate the exact p-value of the MH test, which was 0.007, a clearly significant result. Today, one would use a program such as STATXACT to obtain the exact p-value as well as an estimate of and confidence interval for the common odds ratio. This has been given in the STATXACT manual (2003, p. 597) where it is shown that the lower end of a 95% confidence interval of the odds a white employee receives a promotion relative to a minority employee is about two. Thus, we can conclude that the odds of a black employee had of being promoted were half those of a white, which is clearly of practical as well as statistical significance. The analysis can be interpreted as a test for the effect of race controlling for eligibility as in Fienberg 27 and the data are also discussed by Agresti. 28 The plaintiff wanted to demonstrate that the most plausible potential explanation of the promotion data, white employees had greater seniority, could not truly 'explain' the statistically significant difference in promotion rates. To accomplish this, data showing that by 1977 the average black employee had worked over 1 year more at the GS-13 level than the average white one. Thus, if seniority had a major role in the promotion process, which might explain why whites received the earlier promotions, it should have worked in favour of the black employees in the later part of the period. The defendant did not suggest an alternative analysis of this data but submitted and analysed post-charge data. At the trial, Judge A. Robinson observed that their analysis should have considered a time frame around the time of the complaint.
A few suggestions to statisticians desiring to increase the validity of and weight given to statistical and scientific evidence
Mann, 29 cited and endorsed by Mallows, 30 noted that if your analysis does not produce results the lawyer who hired you desired; you will likely be replaced. Indeed, he notes that many attorneys act as though they will be able to find a statistician who will give them the results they want and that 'regrettably they may often be correct'. This state of affairs unfortunately perpetuates the statement that there are 'lies, damn lies and statistics' attributed to both B. Disraeli and M. Twain. Statisticians have suggested questions that judges may ask experts 31 and on related ethical issues arising in giving testimony. 32 Here, we mention a few more suggestions for improving statistical testimony and close with a brief discussion questioning the wisdom of a recent editorial that appeared in Science.
1. Mann 33 is correct in advising statisticians who are asked to testify to inquire as to the existence of other data or the analysis of any other previous expert the lawyer consulted. I would add that these are especially important considerations if you are asked to examine data very shortly before a trial as you will have a limited time to understand the data and how it was generated and will need to totally rely on the data and background information the lawyer provides. In civil cases, it is far preferable for an expert to be involved during the period when discovery is being carried out. Both sides are asking the other for relevant data and information and it is easier for you to tell the lawyer the type of data that you feel would help answer the relevant questions. If the lawyers ignore your requests or do not give you a sensible justification, 34 you should become concerned. The author's experience in Valentino illustrates this point. The first regression equation we developed for the plaintiffs considered an employee's education and length of government service but did not include occupation as the codes used in the file changed during the time period, making them difficult to work with. 35 Shortly before the trial I asked whether there was any information related to occupation and was told that there was an entry for special degree, which indicated various special areas an employee had studied. This field was omitted from the original file the lawyers gave us so we needed to merge the files and re-run the model just prior to the trial. After finding that employees with business, engineering or law degrees received 33 See supra n. 16. 34 Let me provide an example of a business justification. You are asked to work for a defendant in an equal employment case concerning the fairness of a layoff carried out in a plant making brakes for cars and Vans Data on absenteeism would appear to be quite useful. The employer knows that the rate of absenteeism in the plant was 'higher' than normal for the industry and might be concerned that if this information was made public in a court record, the defendant might become involved in many suits arising from accidents involving cars with brakes made there. Since the corporation is a profit-making organization, not a scientific one, it will carry out a 'cost-benefit' analysis comparing the corporation's potential liability in accident cases to that in the discrimination case in order to decide whether you will be given the data. 35 The defendant also did not include occupation but used the level or grade of the employee in its place. As noted previously, supra n. 22, the trial court accepted this 'proxy' but the appellate court questioned whether it was proper as an employee's level would reflect discrimination in promotion.
by guest on July 14, 2015 http://lpr.oxfordjournals.org/ Downloaded from about the same salary increase, we then included a single indicator for having a degree in one of the three areas. Because we had such a limited amount of time available to incorporate the new, but potentially important information that did reduce the estimated coefficient on sex by a meaningful amount, 36 we did not have time to explore how best to present the analysis.
To assist the court, it would have been preferable to use separate indicators for each degree since it was not clear that the indicator special degree was limited to employees with one of the three specialties. Both opinions downplayed this factor because the defendant's expert testified that it was unreliable because the information depended on whether applicants listed any specialty on their form and the court believed that if a history major decided to mention it they would be coded as a history major but if they did not they would not have a special degree. 37 While this statement is accurate, no evidence was submitted that showed any employees with any particular major were more or less likely to answer the special degree question. Furthermore, majors in history, literature and similar subjects would all be considered non-special degree holders in the second regression so whether or not they answered the question would have had no effect on the regression analysis. In order for the limited 'special degree' indicator used to fail to adequately reflect an employee's qualification for those better-paying occupations, a sizeable percentage of holders of those degrees would need to have omitted that information. It does not seem likely that many employees with these qualifications would not mention them and no data were submitted indicating that this happened. 38 The issue of assessing the reliability of the information gathered from personnel files arose in a recent decision concerning a motion for summary judgement. 39 Thus, it is important for statisticians to obtain all relevant data and have an adequate amount of time to assess its reliability and the effect of the inevitable imperfections in a real-world data set on the inferences drawn. 2. One task experts are asked to perform is to criticize or raise questions about the findings and methodology of the testimony given by the other party's expert. This is one place where it is easy for one to become too partisan, a general problem noted by Meier, 40 and lose her scientific objectivity. Before raising a criticism, one should ask whether it will have an important impact on the ultimate inference. Could it make a difference in either the conclusion or the we given to it? 41 In addition to checking that the assumptions underlying the analysis they are presenting are basically satisfied, one step an expert can carry out to protect her own statistical analyses from being unfairly criticized is to carry out a sensitivity analysis. Many methods for assessing whether an omitted variable could change an inference have been developed 42 and 36 The reduction was about 1 standard deviation, i.e. the t-statistic of the sex coefficient without the special degree information was about −6 but changed to about −5 when it was included in the model. Shultz, 815 F.2d 84, 99 (DC Cir. 1984) and Allen v. Seidman, 881 F.2d 375, 379-380 (7th Cir. 1989) , have required critics of a statistical analysis to do more than merely assert that there is a flaw or imperfection. They require the defendant to provide evidence to support the contention that the missing data or other flaw would explain the disparity or have a major effect on the ultimate inference.
39 For example, McReynolds v. Sodexho Marriott Services, 95 F.E.P. 187, 203 (D.D.C. 2004 ), citing EEOC v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 839 F.2d 302, 327 (7th Cir. 1988 44 While the lawyers and client might request that some details of the case not be reported so that the particular case, parties involved or information about salaries of individual employees are not identifiable, they should not be concerned about your discussing how existing methodology was used or adapted for use on the data. If you perceive that the client or lawyer want to be very restrictive about the use and dissemination of the data and your analysis, you should think seriously about becoming involved. I realize that it is much easier for an academic statistician to say 'no' in this situation, than statisticians who do consulting for a living; especially if they have a long-term business relationship with a law firm. Of course, both you and the lawyers should abide by any arrangements, including limitations on the timing of any publication that you have agreed upon. 4. Statisticians are now being asked by judges to advise them in 'Daubert' hearings, which arise when one party in the case challenges the scientific validity or reliability of the expert testimony the other side desires to use. This is a useful service that all scientific professions can provide the legal system. Before assessing a proposed expert's testimony and credentials, it is wise for you to look over the criteria the court suggested in the Daubert opinion as well as some examples of decisions in such matters. 45 Because courts take a skeptical view of 'new techniques' that have not been subject to peer review but appear to have been developed specifically for the case at hand, one should not fault an expert who does not use the most recently developed method but uses a previously existing method that has been generally regarded in the field as appropriate for the particular problem. The issue is not whether you would have performed the same analysis the expert in the case conducted but whether the analysis is appropriate and statistically sound. Indeed, Kadane 46 conducted a Bayesian analysis of data arising in an equal employment case and confirmed an inference obtained with a frequentist method used in biostatistics that had been previously suggested. 47 He noted that it is reassuring when two approaches lead to the same inference. In my experience, this often occurs when data sets of moderate to large sample size are examined and one uses some common sense in interpreting any difference. 48 5. A 'Daubert' hearing is an appropriate forum to provide the judge with questions to ask an expert about the statistical methodology utilized. 49 This may be effective in demonstrating to a court that a non-statistician really does not have a reasonable understanding of some basic concepts such as power or the potential effect of violations of the assumptions underlying the methods used. Statisticians who plan to testify should be prepared to be questioned about their previous testimony in similar cases as well as any relevant articles they have authored. If you would adopt a different approach now than previously, you should be prepared to explain why. This will not be a problem when there have been major advances in methodology or the availability of appropriate software. If you have previously analysed similar data by one method, say regression, and you now plan to testify that the assumptions required for the use of the method are not satisfied by the data in the current case, you should be able to substantiate the reasoning underlying your position. 50 Finally, an interesting ethical issue that scientific experts face was raised by the editorial by Kennedy 51 the editor-in-chief of one of the most important scientific journals in which he correctly notes that there is a difference between the search for truth and the search for justice. Then he discusses an epidemiologic study that was conducted for plaintiffs suing IBM for medical problems arising from their employment in the manufacture of computer chips. He noted that there had been a protective order requiring that the data about the mortality of its employees from various diseases obtained from IBM should only be used in the legal case. An accompanying letter from a representative of IBM noted that the epidemiologist involved had consented to this protective order. 52 After the trial judge decided that the study should not be admitted as evidence, the epidemiologists submitted a paper with their findings to a journal. Not surprisingly, IBM objected and the publisher decided not to publish. Dr. Kennedy noted that a dozen other authors withdrew their papers from the journal in protest and stated that while the decision to shield the work may have served the interests of justice, the scientific community and the public have been prevented from reaching their own conclusions about this important topic.
While I advocate (see item 3) that arrangements for important methodology and findings to be published should be made, if in order to obtain access to a database one makes a promise (whether it is to keep the identity of subjects confidential or to use it for only one pre-specified purpose) then one should keep that promise. Not only is that the ethical thing to do but also it preserves the integrity of the individual statistician and our profession. the significance of the results increases in a continuous fashion'. Similarly, Judge R. Posner in Frontiers of Legal Theory (2001, pp. 372-374) observed that the 0.05 level was chosen in order to ration pages in scientific journals, which is not relevant to the admissibility of statistical studies in litigation. 49 This also gives the judge an opportunity to find their own expert who can discuss the issues with the trial judge and provide some material from books and articles that can be shown to the testifying experts, thereby implementing the approach described in Comment 2 of Section 1. The use of court-appointed experts is discussed by CECIL, J. S. & WILLGANG, T. E. (1994) Accepting Daubert's invitation: defining a role for court-appointed experts in assessing scientific validity. Emory L. J., 43, 995, and FARRELL, M. G. (1994) Coping with scientific evidence: the use of special masters. Emory L. J., 43, 927. 50 In the context of a regression, you might be able to demonstrate that quite a few residuals from the regression fitted to the present data seem to be outliers or have unduly large influence. Other problems indicated by the residuals having widely different variances or being very far from normally distributed could make the inferences drawn from the regression questionable. In contrast, when you carried out these same checks in other cases, these problems did not occur.
51 KENNEDY, D. (2004) Science, law, and the IBM case. Science, 305, 309.
It is also important to consider the effect on the public's image of scientific research if the scientific community supported the two epidemiologists who had violated their promise to IBM and the protective order of the California court. Will the public continue to trust scientists to keep promises about the confidentiality of other information? While Dr. Kennedy is correct that scientific truth about some chemical exposures is being delayed (only slightly as related studies are being conducted), in the long-run it may well be far more important to ensure that the public trusts scientific researchers and continues to participate in epidemiologic and especially genetic studies. In the past, employers have conducted serious epidemiologic studies and published them 53 and employers should be encouraged to keep mortality and morbidity records of their employees along with the chemicals they are exposed to on the job. If this information can be used 'against' them, employers may simply keep the minimum amount of health information required by law and then only for the minimum amount of time.
